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ask: Are there more useful beliefs available to usabout the world, about texts, about the relations between them-than those that typically generate new-historicist activity?
In his introduction to The Forms of Power, Stephen Greenblatt attempts to characterize a new critical mode "set apart from both the dominant historical scholarship of the past and the formalist criticism that partially displaced this scholarship in the decades after World War Two." Unlike the old historicism, which was "monological [and] concerned with discovering a single political vision," the new historicism recognizes a variety of competing centers of cultural power. This complex cultural environment, moreover, is itself constituted by interpretation. Here too there is a contrast with the old historicism, in which the cultural environment, having "the status of an historical fact [and] not thought to be the product of the historian's interpretation," could "serve as a stable point of reference, beyond contingency, to which literary interpretation can securely refer" (5). Greenblatt makes a similar point at the beginning of Renaissance Self-Fashioning. If we would not "drift back toward a conception of art as addressed to a timeless, cultureless, universal human essence," we must maintain the connection between literature and society. At the same time, he refuses to give presumed facts of culture priority over literary interpretation. "If . . . literature is viewed exclusively as the expression of social rules and instructions, it risks being absorbed entirely into an ideological superstructure" (4). Greenblatt prefers to see literary and cultural knowledge as parts of the same interpretive enterprise, as interanimating each other. He therefore attempts to investigate "both the social presence to the world of the literary text and the social presence of the world in the literary text" (6).
Of the two claims here-one not to be monological, the other not to privilege the social over the literary text-consider the second in conjunction with Greenblatt's brief essay "King Lear and Harsnett's 'Devil Fiction."' The essay begins with a skeptical reference "to modern critics [who] tend to assume that Shakespearean self-consciousness and irony lead to a radical transcendence" of Renaissance culture (239) and then discusses Samuel Harsnett's Declaration of Egregious Popish Impostures. Observing that "where Harsnett had considered exorcism as a stage play, Shakespeare's play is itself a secular version of the ritual of exorcism" (241),
Greenblatt concludes:
Hence the ideological and historical situation of King Lear produces the oscillation, the simultaneous affirmation and negation, the constant undermining of its own assertions and questioning of its own practices-in short, the supreme aesthetic self-consciousness-that leads us to celebrate its universality, its literariness, and its transcendence of all ideology.
We have come a long way from the mutually generative interpretation of culture and text. Here the text is said to be produced by its ideological and historical situation; it is unambiguously dependent, while the culture is unambiguously determining. Gone as well is the acknowledgment that history is itself a text, constituted by interpretation; rather, Harsnett has assumed the objective status of a stable point of reference. Elsewhere, too, Greenblatt's characteristic interpretive strategy is to begin from cultural history, typically with a colonialist episode, and then proceed to the literary text. Despite the reassuring disavowals of privilege, the cultural text tends to be the prior phenomenon, chronologically if not ontologically, at least for the reader who negotiates the course of Greenblatt The flow here is markedly one way, from the cultural to the literary text, and the effect again is to privilege the cultural text as the stable and determining point of reference. Although the word production is not used, the implicit assumption is the same: as Harsnett (or the cultural matrix embodied in Harsnett) produced Lear, so Thomas Harriot produces Henry IV, Part 1. In the Henry IV essay Greenblatt avoids the tri- To understand this whole conception of Hal, from rakehell to monarch, we need in effect a poetics of Elizabethan power" (56-57). We may indeed need this, as we needed and still need the Elizabethan World Picture, but we need a lot more besides.2 "In Dramatic composition," according to Maurice Morgann's famous adage, "the Impression is the Fact" (4). In Greenblatt, however, dramatic impressions are subordinated to and controlled by facts of social history that seem to stand behind them. It would be easy to name other newhistoricist critics who, like Greenblatt (though usually far less interestingly and sophisticatedly), fail to live up to their claims about not granting a determining priority and stability to social history. But at this point I think it is more useful to shift to a general discussion and ask why these claims are hard to achieve. Here once again Greenblatt can help us begin, because he fully understands the kind of problem he is dealing with and the critical history from which it develops. "Though Marx himself vigorously resisted [the] functional absorption of art," he writes at the beginning of Renaissance Self-Fashioning, "Marxist aesthetics . .. has never satisfactorily resolved the theoretical problems raised in the Grundrisse and elsewhere" (4). Nor do I find successful any of the solutions proposed in the current revitalization of Marxist criticism, of which the new historicism is a part.
It is tempting to construe the problem as inhering in the relation between theory and application, and in this context Fredric Jameson's work is exemplary. Jameson so interestingly and complexly nuances the relation between ideology and textuality that the distinction between them seems to disappear, as in his proposal for the rewriting of the literary text in such a way that the latter may itself be seen as the rewriting or restructuration of a prior historical or ideological subtext, it being always understood that the "subtext" is not immediately present as such, not some common-sense external reality, nor even the conventional narratives of history manuals, but rather must itself always be (re)constructed after the fact. The problem in Marxist aesthetics, however, is not essentially in the relation between theory and application but in the theory itself. Take for example Althusser's attempt in For Marx to soften the rigid orthodox hierarchy of substructure and superstructure. The superstructures remain relatively autonomous in their "specific effectivity"; the substructure, the "economic mode of production," becomes determinant only "in the last instance" (111). But this last instance is apocalyptic. By contrast, in History, these instances, the superstructures, etc.-are never seen to step respectfully aside when their work is done or, when the Time comes, as his pure phenomena, to scatter before his Majesty the Economy as he strides along the royal road of the Dialectic. From the first moment to the last, the lonely hour of the "last instance" never comes.
While Althusser has come a long way from orthodox Marxism, the economic mode of production remains his conceptual point of reference, and thus the hierarchical idea persists, if in a less rigid form. In his "Letter on Art," Althusser attempts a similar strategic redeployment of the text (or "art") and ideology. Building on suggestions in Macherey's discussion of Lenin as critic of Tolstoy, Althusser develops the idea that art "presupposes a retreat, an internal distantiation, from the very ideology from which" it emerges (222-23).3 Even in this formulation, however, ideology retains a privileged or substructural position, preceding and determining discourse. The reason "the theoretical problems raised in the Grundrisse" have never been "satisfactorily resolved," I would suggest, is that they cannot be. We Seemingly important distinctions could be made among critics like these-between, for example, Tennenhouse's interpretation of A Midsummer Night's Dream as idealizing state authority and Montrose's contrary view that the play reflects Shakespeare's will to resist such authority, to create a space of his own that cannot be claimed by female-monarchical power. Such distinctions depend on whether the play is seen to ally itself with dominant cultural interests or with subordinate ones, but even these distinctions do not seem finally to matter very much. A case in point is Brown's discussion of "masterless men," a social phenomenon that embodies a countercultural threat to authority. "In The Tempest," Brown notes, Stephano and Trinculo "obviously represent such masterless men" (52-53; my emphasis), and thus the play serves as a kind of cautionary tale from the perspective of the ruling class: "the assembled aristocrats in the play, and perhaps in the original courtly audiences, come to recognise in these figures their own common identity-and the necessity for a solidarity among the ruling class in face of such a threat" (53). Brown recognizes an aspect of Stephano and Trinculo beyond the interests of ruling-class ideology, namely, our simple and raw pleasure in their appearance, but this pleasure turns out to be subordinated to the ends of magistracy after all, "a vital adjunct to power, a utilisation of the potentially disruptive to further the workings of power" (53). According to this argument, a favorite one of Greenblatt's, a dominant authority produces elements of apparent subversion or transgression as a means of maintaining its control.
The frequent recurrence of the words power and discourse in new-historicist criticism reflects the influence of Foucault, in whom Greenblatt may have discovered the idea that authority produces subversion. And yet, if we are to be precise, it is the early Foucault whom the new historicists follow. In his later work, he struck off self-consciously in a new direction, that of the dispositif rather than the episteme, and showed far more responsiveness to heterogeneity. In The History of Sexuality, Foucault tells us that "we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between . . . the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies" (100). He also redefines power, vastly extending its reference. "We must," he says "conceive of ... power without the king" (91):
Power's condition of possibility . .. must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate; it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable. The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.
Power is the whole thing, in other words-"thick description" indeed. In comparison with this passage, the work of even the most flexible and wideranging of the new historicists looks thin. For them, power is still reified in the monarch, or in a particular set of dominant institutions, and discourse is located in a starkly simple model of domination and subversion. One measure of this thinness is the way new historicists ignore the contrasting rhetorical situations of the texts they discuss. Jonathan Goldberg, for instance, applies basically the same set of interpretive concerns to a Jonson masque, in which the king is at the center of the action and the audience, and to a Jonson play for the public stage, like Sejanus, even though for Jonson himself the difference in audience and theatrical setting was of tremendous concern. Similarly, Tennenhouse can move from Petrarchan lyrics, with their more or less courtly audience, to a public theater play like A Midsummer Night's Dream or Henry IV without feeling any pressure to modify his thematics. Or recall Brown's comment that Stephano and Trinculo strengthen the class solidarity of "the assembled aristocrats in the play, and perhaps in the original courtly audiences." The "perhaps" commendably disclaims certainty about the responses of Shakespeare's courtly audience, but an assumption remains that the audience was a courtly one and that the play must be understood with that specific reference in mind. That there were royal command performances we know, but we know also that The Tempest was performed at Blackfriars, and most people believe at the Globe as well, for economic reasons that new historicists especially ought to respect. It simply did not make sense to spend the time and the money to gear a play for a one-shot performance, or even for a very limited market run. And as Richard Levin points out (170, 240-41) , no hard evidence indicates that any Renaissance play was written specifically and exclusively for any particular occasion.
In For an answer we can turn to Goldberg's explanation of how Sejanus can represent James's concerns about authority even though the play antedates James's accession or the availability of James's own written representations of these concerns: "the play spoke to present concerns; . . . following Foucault, we can point to shared epistemic limits conditioning discourse and actions, onstage and off" (177; my emphasis). This argument is like Montrose calling Elizabeth "a pervasive culturalpresence," a "condition" of "imaginative possibility"-not just for A Midsummer Night's Dream, but for all imaginative possibility. The condition that Goldberg and Montrose claim to understand is really a precondition, in the sense that it stands above or exists before all the particular circumstances of the text. These circumstancesauthor, audience, chronology-can be ignored because they do not matter. What matters is "power relations," "authority and transgression," and the other recurring terms in new-historicist criticism; they constitute an "episteme," replacing what appeared in an older critical vocabulary as the zeitgeist or the "spirit of the age." The knowledge they furnish of "present concerns" in the Renaissance is a universal knowledge, good for all concrete situations.
According to Dollimore and Sinfield, "Historical context undermines the transcendent significance traditionally accorded to the literary text and allows us to recover its histories" (Political vii). What I am claiming, however, is that the histories being recovered are themselves transcendental signifieds (or sometimes, perhaps, transcendental ways of signifying) in the sense that their capacity to explain seems independent of many particulars. In this sense there can be no question of "Recovering History" (the rubric under which the first six essays in Political Shakespeare are grouped) in the way Dollimore and Sinfield mean, as though history were out there just waiting to be found. This notion is like Professor Welch answering the phone in Lucky Jim: "History speaking." But history speaks in our voice. History does not tell us what the text is, because we decide what history is, and then put history into the text, rather than the other way around. Or maybe it is better to say that we "recover" the text and history at the same time, but again in the sense not of finding what was lost out there but of adding our own needs and desirescoating anew, re-covering the text in a Barthesian manner with words of our own.
From this perspective, the new historicists' contextualization is just another form of interpretation, another way of deciding where and how to center the competing claims made on our attention by a variety of needs and desires. The Tempest can help make my point here. New historicists contend that colonialism is "the articulatory principle of The Tempest's diversity," but colonialism can also be seen as only a marginal or allusive presence in a text with some other center. A metadramatic interpretation would put art at the center; an ethical one would put self-control or virtus or sophrosyne at the center; a textualist one would see the center as a supplement, arguing that the center is the margin or that there is no center. How do we choose among these Tempests? If we answer, "By determining which version is historical," we raise another question: "which historical version?" History is something that we make or "do" (J. H. Hexter's word), and there are many ways of doing it: as the unfolding of God's providence; as bunk; as all the best that has been thought and said in the world; as a nightmare from which we are trying to escape; as the reenactment of past thought in one's mind; even as the doing of history. New historicists often privilege their criticism by assuming that their version of history is the thing itself, as if they were doing history, but if we understand that they are merely doing history, then that privilege disappears. To say that the colonialist Tempest is superior because "the Renaissance was an age characterized by the expansion of power" does not answer the question, it begs it. Deciding that some such statement is the right thing to say about the Renaissance is precisely the interpretive choice in question. As a version of the preferred view, it cannot be said to justify the preference. (In the same way, textualists cannot justify their version by declaring something like "recent criticism has demonstrated that words can connect only with other words." Whatever may be valuable in such a claim-probably as much or as little as saying that the Renaissance is an age of power expansion-derives from its interpretive power rather than from its descriptive accuracy.)
At the beginning of Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Greenblatt himself acknowledges, at least implicitly, almost everything I have said here. Though other new historicists usually do not make such acknowledgments (and though Greenblatt himself frequently writes as if he has forgotten them), we should recognize that nothing I have said undermines the new-historicist enterprise. In trying to divest these critics of their imperial new claims to privilege, I am leaving them naked only in the sense that all interpreters are naked. In arguing that they are not less "monological" than the old historicists, I do not dispute that they are monological in a different way. This difference is crucial, and it remains the basis for the value-real or imagined, great or small-of new-historicist criticism. We are back then to the main questions I raised above, but we can now phrase them a little more specifically. 
For many new historicists, the power over the text derived from this suspicion is instrumental to social change, part of the project of making the world a better place. Dollimore and Sinfield, for example, assert that "cultural materialism" (their phrase for the new historicism) "registers its commitment to the transformation of a social order which exploits people on the grounds of race, gender and class" (Political viii). Frequently these political claims for interpretive styles are made tacitly, as in Edward Said's implication that a connection somehow exists between formalism and the bombing of Vietnam (2-3) or in Lentricchia's controlling suggestion throughout Criticism and Social Change that Kenneth Burke's version of reading leads to social justice and Paul de Man's to an acceptance of the absence of justice. Such connections seem too abstract and polemical to be convincing. It is impossible to serve Kant and Marx, say the new historicists, but the young Empson did just that. I am not denying that there are connections between interpretive and political actions; such a claim would be counterintuitive and intolerable. But the connections are tenuous and volatile, and they vary from reader to reader, text to text. Moreover, if transforming an exploitative social order should be the prime directive of one's activity, then there are simply more effective ways of proceeding. Sinfield admits as much in his wry and amusing concession that even the approved "cultural materialist" mode of "teaching Shakespeare's plays and writing books about them is unlikely to bring down capitalism, but it is a point for intervention" ("Give" 154). Maybe so, but not a very significant point, especially in the context of Eldridge Cleaver's remark that "if you're not part of the solution you're part of the problem." "Marx and Engels were well informed of new and important literary developments," Pierre Macherey assures us, "but they never made anything of their knowledge because they never had the time" (105). When there is a world to change, even a thoroughly ideologized text may not seem important enough.
Despite the strong political advocacy of many new-historicist critics, it would be wrong, I think, to regard the new historicism itself as necessarily or essentially associated with political action, if for no other reason than that such a view would exclude the most powerful of all its practitioners, Stephen Greenblatt. His is not an activist criticism; in fact, the story that Greenblatt always tells is the reverse of a revolutionary one. "There is subversion, no end of subversion," says Kafka to Max Brod in a remark that Greenblatt quotes twice with approval in his Henry IV essay, "only not for us" ("Invisible Bullets" 53, 57). In the epilogue to Renaissance SelfFashioning Greenblatt explains that this conclusion was forced on him:
When I first conceived this book several years ago, I intended to explore the ways in which major English writers of the sixteenth century created their own performances.
. . . But as my work progressed, I perceived that fashioning oneself and being fashioned by cultural institutions-family, religion, state-were inseparably intertwined. In all my texts and documents, there were, so far as I could tell, no moments of pure, unfettered subjectivity; indeed, the human subject itself began to seem remarkably unfree, the ideological product of the relations of power in a particular society.
In this view, human power to shape the world, even to fashion that small part of the world called the self, turns out to be illusory. There is no free space in Greenblatt's conception of culture, not in the theater, not for the self. As sometimes in Foucault, or at least in the earlier Foucault, we are only what we are constituted to be by the power relations that govern, anonymously and without human face, even the governors. New-historicist criticism then, though it can naturally take a politically activist form, need not be identified with that form, and its valuing of detachment cannot be hooked necessarily to the project of social change. Why then is detachment valued? The answer appears to be in the conception of the text as a threat, a hostile otherness designed to dominate the reader. But this response raises a further question: Why is the text so conceived? Not because it is "scientific" to conceive it this way. This criticism is scientific only in the same way it is historical; that is, it is scientific in a particular way. By scientific Belsey means simply predictive; guaranteed procedures enable us to see the text as a move in a power game. But at issue here is precisely the assumption that the text is such a move-or the "proposition" that it is: "Althusser proposes that the task of ideology is to conceal its own role in reproducing the conditions of the capitalist mode of production" (Critical 128; my emphasis).
For an explanation of the new historicists' wish to conceive of the text as hostile and threatening, we can turn again to Lentricchia: "the activity of interpretation . . . does not passively 'see,' as Kenneth Burke puts it, but constructs a point of view in its engagement with textual events, and in so constructing produces an image of history as social struggle, of, say, class struggle" (11). In this view, the relation between the text and the audience replicates exactly the antagonistic power relations at the center of new-historicist thematics. According to Jame- Yet this sort of assertion is itself vulnerable, because it is not really an argument. Its persuasive capacity depends first of all on our believing the assumption that the will to power determines human activity and social organization. It simply repeats this assumption as a way of responding to a contrary assumption, or a contrary intuition, about kindness and benevolence. It is like Ring Lardner's "'Shut up!' he explained." Saying "it's a jungle out there" will not convince those who believe that "love makes the world go round." The reverse is true as well, of course. If then we choose between these competing intuitions, the choice cannot be determined by verification, for there is no way of deciding which intuition is right except from a position where the decision has in effect already been made. I am not arguing that choice is impossible, merely trying to relocate its basis, to make the primary consideration, not correspondence to the way things really are, but usefulness.
I myself do not find it useful to believe that human activity is essentially determined by the will to power, because it is hard to base much of a future on that belief. More to the point, Lentricchia finds himself in the same position, of having to imagine a future that somehow transcends antagonism: "a genuine community . . . the establishment of a consent, of a 'we' . . . Marx without Stalin" (13). Lentricchia nowhere gives us any substantial description of this goal or even the slightest idea of how to achieve it. He cannot, I think, because he has renounced not only notions of benevolence and bourgeois cliches about pluralism but even the Marxist version of such cliches, proletarian solidarity, to which his own training and theoretical commitment would naturally be drawn. Indeed, some of the wittiest and strongest parts of Criticism and Social Change dismantle, or show how Kenneth Burke dismantled, those very cliches. But without these notions, or some version of them, or room among one's beliefs to include some version of them, how can we imagine a community of any kind, let alone "genuine" community? "It's a jungle out there" by itself leads only to more jungles, where the best we can hope for is to become King of the Forest. We do not therefore have to believe that "love makes the world go round," but we should have room for this belief, next to the room for the jungle. It would be foolish indeed (or saintly) to hold that benevolence is the human essence, the force that through the green fuse drives our flower. But is it any less foolish to substitute the will to power? Getting beyond humanism is supposed to mean getting beyond such essences, not merely exchanging one for another, replacing the flattering with the cynical.
Anyone who, like me, is reluctant to accept the will to power as the defining human essence will probably have trouble with the critical procedures of the new historicists and with their interpretive conclusions. Acquiring power over the text will seem a costly achievement, since what it sacrifices is the potential power of the text-the power to open up new areas of experience, unfamiliar ways of being in the world. New-historicist procedures are designed to resist any such power, to work around or get beyond immediate textual impres-sions to arrive at a predetermined point of theoretical understanding, which is the point from which one comes to the text in the first place. Lentricchia observes that critical activity "produces an image of history as social struggle, of, say, class struggle." The "say" is good, suggesting a coincidence, the possibility that any number of images might have emerged. Here we can also recall Belsey's remark that "scientific criticism . . . recognises in the text not 'knowledge' but ideology itself." Newhistoricist criticism is a criticism of recognition, of knowing again what one knew before. It is criticism that systematically deprives the text of its capacity to surprise, and who wants to go to a theater where there are no surprises?
To the extent that the new historicism takes the surprise out of theater, it seems to me a bad thing. Nonetheless, I want finally to acknowledge the enormous interest and energy this kind of criticism has generated. It has done so in part because, as I mentioned at the beginning, it is a more varied activity than my representation suggests. 
